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These are real incidents from our practice, anonymized to protect the clients. The details are the point: what the attack did, what the recovery took, and what changed so it could not happen again.
A marketing site compromised through a page-builder upload flaw: 34 polyglot shells across the docroot. Full sweep, entry point patched, styling restored from archived copies.
A company site serving malware 403s to every visitor after backdoor droppers hit its media folders. Rebuilt clean on custom code; the CMS retired entirely.
A production business app orphaned by its developer: undocumented, unpatched, failing nightly. Stabilized, documented, and adopted into managed care.
A lead-generation platform's marketing site began serving defaced pages after attackers exploited an upload function in its CMS page-builder extension. The compromise had planted 34 web shells disguised as images across the file tree, several designed to reinstall the rest if any were removed individually.
The recovery: full file-system sweep against a known-good baseline, all shells removed in one pass, the vulnerable upload path closed, credentials rotated, and the original styling restored from verified archive copies. The site was serving clean pages the same day, and hardening now blocks execution from every upload path.
A California business discovered its site had been serving a malware warning page for weeks: backdoor droppers in its image folders had gotten the whole domain quarantined by the host's scanner, taking every page offline for every visitor. The CMS behind it was years out of date, with the same extension family that caused the breach still installed.
The recovery decision was strategic rather than cosmetic: rather than patch a platform that would be re-exploited, the site was rebuilt as fast, hand-coded pages with every URL preserved, and the old CMS was retired entirely. The infection could not follow, because the code it infected no longer exists in production.
Every case in the drawer repeats three lessons. The entry point is almost always known, published, and patchable before the attack. Cleanup without closing the entry point is rented time. And the sites that leave the treadmill for custom infrastructure do not come back through the emergency door.
The refund is not a promise you have to chase. If we miss the first milestone deadline, Stripe reverses your payment on its own, with no phone call and no forms. That is how sure we are.
Because publishing a client's security incident with their name attached would be a second incident. Prospective clients are welcome to ask for references on a call.
Usually, yes. Describe your situation on the diagnostic call and the engineer will tell you honestly how similar incidents have gone, including the hard parts.
Call now and a master engineer will be looking at your site within minutes. Flat pricing, live progress, and an automatic refund if we miss the hour.